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Abstract- Iran's geographical location together with its vast amount of natural resources are the main factors that drives 
Iran’s expansionary desire and hegemony in the Arab Gulf region. Iraq has become an essential part in the strategies of 
Iranian decision-makers after 2003 that has to be maintained. Iran’s top priority was that Iraq must become a part of Iran's 
sphere of influence in competition with the U.S. presence in the Gulf in the post-Saddam Era. Iran takes advantage of its 
relations with the Iraqi government formed after 2003 to achieve its political and economic goals. This paper discusses and 
analyzes the role of political and economic interests of Iran in Iraq in the post-Saddam Era. 
 




The Iranian-Iraqi relations have been characterized by 
struggles and persistent tensions despite the religious 
and social bonds they share. The border between Iran 
and Iraq is 1280 Km long. There were incessant 
border disputes in spite of the fact that many 
agreements on the shared border were concluded 
between two countries, e.g., the Algeria Agreement1 
in 1975 which decided the river border in Shat Al-
Arab as per the “Taluk” line, the mid-line of the 
navigable water (Al-Budairi, 2008: 378).  
The Iran-Iraq war broke out in 1980 due to two main 
reasons. The first was an ideological reason which 
stemmed from the Islamic ideological threats posed 
by the Iranian Revolution. The second reason was 
that Saddam's new regime had ambitions of 
compelling the new regime in Iran to recognize that 
the balance of power in the Gulf region was in favor 
of the Iraqi military forces, in addition to Iraq's desire 
to control the entire region of the Shat Al-Arab 
(Tripp, 2006:305). 
 
According to the gain considerations in international 
relations, Iran was the first beneficiary of the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait in 1990 for supporting and 
maintaining its interests in the region. Iran sought to 
settle its scores with the two parties of the dispute 
who sought recourse to gain Iran’s trust and 
friendship from the outset at the relations level. Iran 
benefited from Iraq which relinquished all its 
demands with regards to its border with Iran and 
sovereignty over territorial waters. Concurrently, Iran 
enhanced its relations with Kuwait and the Gulf  
                                                             
1 The Algeria Agreement is an agreement signed between Iraq and 
Iran on March 6, 1975 between the then-Vice President Saddam 
Hussein and the Shah of Iran Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, under the 
supervision of the former Algerian President "Houari 
Boumediene". It was to settle the maritime border disputes between 
the two countries in the Shatt al-Arab area. Iraq has canceled this 
agreement after the fall of Shah's regime in 1979, which led to the 




States and condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
and agreed with the international community on the 
need for the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait 
(Al-Ghoneim, 2002: 25). 
 
Despite the Iranian condemnation of the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait, it simultaneously opposed the 
U.S. presence in the region and also called for a holy 
“jihad” against their presence. The unprecedented 
presence of huge numbers of foreign troops equipped 
with advanced weapons can be attributed to the 
economic and military capability and geo-strategic 
location of Iraq, which indirectly indicated that Iraq 
was the most powerful regional power in the region. 
Therefore, Iran’s ambition to become the solitary 
regional power would be turned down too. Hence, 
Iran’s rejection of the foreign presence was inevitable 
(Al-Jorani, 2012:81). 
 
In 2003, the U.S. threats of using military force 
against Iraq gave Iran the pretext to build good 
relations with the Gulf States especially Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia. This facilitated and expedited 
rapprochement for more economic, political and 
security cooperation. Although Iran supported and 
facilitated the U.S. to occupy Iraq and overthrow 
Saddam's regime, it viewed the military build-up and 
occupation of Iraq as an attempt to reshape the 
geopolitical map in the Gulf region and weaken the 
regional powers (Mubaidin, 2007:15). 
 
II. IRAN’S ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
 
During the rule of the former Iranian president, 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi Shah (1941-1979), Iran 
played an important role in Middle East because of its 
alliance with the U.S. and Israel and it also had 
ambitions to dominate the economic resources in that 
region. Iran’s foreign policy in the 1960’s was to 
expand its economic and political influence towards 
the Arab Gulf in the south, the Arab states in the 
west, Afghanistan and Pakistan and India in the east. 
Iran justified its action by saying that it was to protect 
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its oil pipelines from the Gulf to Asia and Europe 
(Al-Hassani 2011).  
 
In 1965, Iran adopted a political project that included 
the annexation of most of the Arab Gulf States by 
Iran. The Iranian government had specified a special 
budget for the aforesaid purpose. Moreover, there 
were some factors that helped Iran to implement its 
political project and they are as follows:  
1. The weakness of the Arab States as a result of their 
defeat in the 1967 war with Israel. 
2. The gradual British withdrawal from the Gulf 
region from 1962 until 1971. 
3. The U.S. supported Iran’s expansionist ambitions 
in Middle East (Helayel, 2011: 24-25). 
4. Iran benefited from its geographical location vis-à-
vis the Arab Gulf States; Iran has the longest 
coastline in comparison with all the Arab Gulf States 
i.e., 1200 km out of 3365 km. Therefore, the maritime 
location is considered to be a major factor for Iran's 
economic and military force, as shown in Table 5.1 
(Al-Swedi 1983:10).  
 
Iran also used an interventionist policy in the internal 
affairs of foreign states in several areas, for example, 
Iran supplied the Kurdish forces in northern Iraq with 
arms to fight against the Iraqi government in Baghdad 
during the nineteen sixties and seventies. Iran's 
military intervention in northern Yemen during the 
civil war in Yemen between 1962 and 1970, Iran's 
participation in the military action against some 
armed groups in the province of “Baluchistan”, 
Pakistan in 1973 and Iran's support of the Omani 
government in its war against the Liberation Front in 
the “Dhofar” region in the southern part of Oman in 
1973 (Al-Hassani 2011). 
 
After the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, there has 
been a major shift in Iran's regional and international 
relations in the Middle East, especially after the 
change of U.S. policy towards Iran whereby it 
became an enemy even though it had been very 
strong ally of the U.S. in the past. The role of Iran 
during that period was to promote Islamic revolution 
to monarchies in the Gulf States and replace them 
with governments that had complete loyalty to Iran 
and the establishment of a sole superior power that is 
able to resist the ambitions of other states in the Gulf 
region (Syed  2013). 
 
On the other hand, Iran’s expansionist ambitions was 
at the expense of Israel as Iran supported the Islamic 
resistance movements in Middle East against Israel, 
for example, the Lebanese Hezbollah as a 
representative of the :Shiites” and the Hamas as the 
representative of the “Sunnis” in Palestine (Amnh 
2010:99). 
 
An important event which had a significant impact on 
Iran’s ambitions in Middle East was Saddam 
Hussein’s success in seizing power in Iraq in 1979 
(Al-Badry 2014:95). The conflict between Iran's 
desire to expand its interests  in the Gulf region and 
the personal ambitions of the Iraqi President, Saddam 
Hussein, to dominate over the Gulf region was the 
main reason that led to the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq 
war in 1980. That period represented the beginning of 
Iranian interference in Iraq and the rest of the Gulf 
States (Baker Institute Study 1998:2). 
 
Due to its fear of the impact of the principles of 
Islamic revolution in Iran on its political system, 
Kuwait supported Iraq financially in its war against 
Iran. As a result, Iran increased its terrorist activities 
in Kuwait in 1983 and attempted to assassinate the 
Emir of Kuwait in 1985. Iran also carried out several 
military operations against Kuwaiti oil sites in the 
Gulf from 1987 to 1988 and these military operations 
prompted the U.S. to protect Kuwait from any 
potential Iranian attacks (Salem 2009).   
 
With the outbreak of the Gulf crisis due to Iraqi’s 
invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Iran was fully aware that 
any change in the political map among the Gulf 
States or inside any of the countries should not be 
allowed if it could lead to the undermining of Iran's 
strategic interests in the Gulf region. Additionally, the 
expansion of Iraq and its seizure of Kuwait’s oil 
fields could also lead to the supremacy of Iraq's 
political and economic status in the region and that 
would be in conflict with Iran's interests (Rajab 1997: 
345). 
 
Throughout the crisis, Iran sought to achieve several 
strategic goals based on its perceptions of the security 
in the Gulf region. Firstly, it sought to strengthen its 
military capabilities and become a dominant power in 
the region without intervening as a party in the war. 
In order to identify the impact of the war on its 
national security, Iran had remained neutral from the 
beginning of the war. Secondly, Iran sought to 
prevent Iraq from becoming a strong state again so 
that it can not compete with Iran and also limit its 
ability to extend its influence and achieve its goals in 
the Arab region. In other words, Iran sought to 
remove Iraq as a competitor in the Gulf region 
because of its military capabilities and this would 
allow Iran to impose its point of view on the countries 
of the region regarding the security of the Gulf region 
(Fouda 2000: 44). Therefore, this crisis represented a 
golden opportunity for Iran to rearrange the balance 
of power in the region and at the same time maintain 
its interests that is in line with the ambitions of its 
political system (Al-Jorani 2012:85). 
After the Second Gulf War, Iran dedicated part of its 
budget for the development of its nuclear program2 
                                                             
2 Iran’s nuclear program has been the subject of global hand-
wringing for more than two decades. While Iran has insisted it is 
not building nuclear weapons, its enrichment of uranium and 
history of deception have created doubts. After years of acrimony 
International Journal of Management and Applied Science, ISSN: 2394-7926                                              Volume-2, Issue-5, May.-2016 
Iranian Interests In Iraq In The Post-Saddam Era 
 
3 
which posed a direct threat to the regional 
neighboring countries of Iran (Mohammad 2007: 56-
57). Thus, Iran's military spending increased from $ 
4.7 billion in 1997 to $ 7.5 billion in 2000 (Syed  
2013). 
 
Besides that, Iran sought to establish free economic 
zones on the Iranian islands in order to develop 
economic relations with Kuwait. Trade exchange 
between the two countries increased from about $ 
78.2 million in 1997, to about $ 345 million in 2000 
and to $ 621 million in 2003 (Kashk 2014:3). 
 
As a result of the improvement of relations between 
Kuwait and Iran, the Kuwaiti foreign minister, Sheikh 
Muhammed Salem Al-Sabah, visited Iran on January 
12, 2002, and signed security and economic 
agreements with Iran and they also explored their 
unified position towards Iraq. Moreover, Sheikh 
Muhammed also requested Iran's assistance to close 
the case files against Kuwaiti prisoners of war in Iraq. 
Iran responded positively with readiness to close the 
said files through diplomatic ties with the Iraqi 
government and also promised to release all Kuwaiti 
prisoners and others from Iraq (Kashk 2014: 1-5). 
 
In 2003, the U.S. threats of using military force 
against Iraq gave Iran the pretext to build good 
relations with the Gulf States especially Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia. This facilitated and expedited 
rapprochement for more economic, political and 
security cooperation. Although Iran supported the 
U.S. occupation of Iraq and the overthrow of Saddam 
regime, but it viewed the U.S. military presence in 
Iraq as an attempt to weaken the regional powers in 
the Arab Gulf region (Mubaidin 2007:15).  
 
In summary, it can be concluded that since the sixties 
and seventies of the last century, Iran had been 
looking forward to achieving its expansionist 
ambitions in the Middle East in general and the Arab 
Gulf region in particular through its strong military 
build-up, and interference in the internal affairs of 
other states based on the respective states’ advantage 
of geographical location and economic resources. On 
the other hand, Iran tried to export the principles of 
its Islamic revolution to neighboring Arab countries 
and replace the current governments with ones that 
have complete loyalty to Iran, and this later led to the 
outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980. After the 
Second Gulf War, Iran tried to play a positive role 
with Kuwait by exploiting its dispute with Iraq. This 
was because Iran was afraid of the growth of Iraq’s 
                                                                                           
and threats to bomb Iran’s facilities, Iran and the world powers 
have agreed to settle the dispute on July 14, 2014. The deal sets 
limits on the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program in exchange for 
relief from economic sanctions that have crimped oil exports and 
crippled its economy (Tirone, 2015). 
 
 
strategic role in the Gulf region and it also wanted to 
achieve greater political and economic gains at the 
expense of the U.S. interests in the region.  
 
III. IRANIAN INTERESTS IN IRAQ IN THE 
POST-SADDAM ERA 
  
Iran's interests in Iraq led to Iran taking actions to 
infiltrate and destabilize the Iraqi regime, thus paving 
the way for Iran to achieve its foreign policy 
objectives in Middle East in general and the Gulf 
region in particular. These interests can be tackled as 
follows: 
 
3.1 Political Influence of Iran in Iraq 
Iraq was the top priority in Iran’s strategy to achieve 
its interests with regards to its foreign policy because 
of the following reasons: 
First, from Iran's perspective, Iraq is a regional power 
that cannot be ignored when looking at the balance of 
power in the region due to several reasons. Iraq has a 
human capital that exceeds 30 million people and it is 
second after Saudi Arabia in terms of oil reserves as it 
has 124 billion barrels which is enough to produce 
three million barrels per day for more than 100 years. 
Thus, the Iranian decision makers recognized the 
importance of Iraq in the regional balance, now and 
in the future (Gregory 1998:81). 
 Iraq received a great deal of attention in Iran’s 
foreign policy because of its geographical adjacency, 
economic wealth and human capital. These elements 
helped Iraq to become one of the most active power 
in the region and a key player in deciding the existing 
regional balances in the Gulf region (Abed, interview, 
2015). 
Secondly, Iraq is the gate- way for Iran to the rest of 
the Gulf States and the Arab World to spread the 
ideology of its Islamic revolution. Therefore, Iran 
would be detached from the Shiite’s presence in Syria 
and south of Lebanon if Iraq is not under its control 
(Gregory 1998:82). 
 
Thirdly, Iran considers that Iraq is a historical, 
geographical and religious extension of Iran. 
Consequently, Iran deems that Iraq should be one of 
its provinces instead of an independent state. In this 
regard, the first Iranian president after the Iranian 
revolution in 1979, “Abu Al-Hasan Bani-Sadr”, 
stated that, "Iraq was throughout history a part of 
“Faris” (Persia) and the Gulf region was always 
Iranian property. Hence, the Gulf's oil lies within 
Persian territories"(Farid 2007:57-60). 
 
The overthrow of Saddam Hussein regime in 2003 
provided the Islamic Republic of Iran with a historic 
opportunity to transform its relations with Iraq, which 
was formerly one of its most implacable enemies. It 
used the long porous border with Iraq, the 
longstanding ties with key Iraqi politicians, the 
political and religious parties and armed groups, and 
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its economic and religious power and military 
intelligence to expand its influence and thus establish 
itself as the key external broker in Iraq (Eisenstadt et 
al. 2011: xi). 
 
The Iranian role in Iraq was closely linked to Iran's 
ambitions to exercise a wider regional role in the Gulf 
region that is proportional to its political, economic 
and military capabilities as well as its geopolitical 
importance.  Iran used a number of tools and policies 
in exercising this role after the U.S. occupation of 
Iraq. Most notably was Iran's desire to extend the 
friendship and cooperation with Iraqi political actors, 
and to have good relations. Such relations would 
depend on dialogue to achieve peace and mutual 
respect for the sovereignty of each country and to 
leave the past wars triggered by Saddam behind. The 
support provided by Iran to many Iraqi Shiite parties 
and militias prevented the U.S. from improving 
stability in Iraq and therefore made Iran a potential 
threat to the U.S. (Al-Ansari, interview, 2015). 
 
Iran’s interests in Iraq have been reflected by its long-
standing regional ambitions and desire to resolve its 
ongoing dispute with the U.S. over the development 
of its nuclear program and the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
After the removal of threats posed by conventional 
military weapons and Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) following the fall of Saddam Hussein in 
2003, Iran’s aim was to prevent Iraq from re-
emerging as a threat with or without the presence of 
the U.S. forces. The prevalence of Shiites in Iraq was 
viewed by Iran as a potential strategic asset that could 
advance its interests. Therefore, the Iranian intentions 
in Iraq partially tallied with those of the U.S., whose 
aim was to establish a democratic government in Iraq 
that can support the interests of the majority, the 
Shiites, and therefore empower potential Shiite allies 
(Al-Badry 2014:220). 
 
However, Iran's objection to divide Iraq into several 
states is one of the most fundamental interests of 
Iran's foreign policy towards Iraq after 2003. For 
Iran, it is easier to deal with Iraq as one central entity 
than dealing with multiple ones.  Iran still has other 
vital interests, for example, keeping Iraq militarily 
weak and unable to threaten it or any other country in 
the region. Moreover, Iran seeks to strengthen its 
dominance in the Shatt Al-Arab area, which has been 
experiencing maritime disputes between the two 
countries (Tu'mah, interview, 2015). 
 
As a result of the growing Iranian role in Iraq after 
the fall of Saddam, Iran has become more influential 
in shaping and steering Iraqi policy towards 
achieving its interests in the region. The most 
important tool employed by Iran to achieve these 
interests was its encouragement to divide Iraq into 
three regions: a Kurdish region in the north, a 
“Sunni” region in the center and a “Shiite” region in 
the south. Eventually, this division would weaken 
Iraq and remove it from the competition circle as a 
regional power (Al- Sussi, interview, 2015). 
 
A report was issued by "Baker-Hamilton", a 
committee formed by the American Congress in 2006 
to investigate the most convenient strategy that 
should be followed in Iraq. The report highlighted the 
Iranian intervention and its support of the militias. It 
also recommended that diplomatic talks should be 
conducted with Iran and Syria to achieve stability in 
Iraq which could then enable the U.S. forces to move 
from a combative position, which was operative as of 
2003, to a supportive position of the Iraqi forces to 
maintain stability (Atwan 2007:32). 
 
On the other hand, it is important for the Iranians to 
deal with Iraq as an ally in order to confront other 
competitors in the region such as Saudi Arabia. 
Hence, Iran has been persistently trying to exert its 
influence on the political process in Iraq in order to 
achieve its interest through the Iraqi political parties 
that were loyal to the Iranian government. The 
Iranian leadership was also seeking to ensure that 
Iraqi territories would not be used by the U.S. or any 
Western country as a base for military attacks on Iran 
because of its efforts to develop its nuclear program 
(Al-Bloushi, interview, 2015 ). 
 
During the U.S. occupation of Iraq (2003-2011), 
Iran’s major interest was to prevent Iraq from 
becoming a strong state once again, which would 
then compete with it and limit its capability to extend 
its influence and achieve its goals in the Gulf region 
(Al-Ghalib 2014:1). Iran has strived to ensure its 
security and territorial integrity through the building 
up of a huge military force that is able to defend its 
territorial integrity and deter any hostile party, 
whether international or regional, from carrying out 
military strikes against it (Hussein 2011:13). 
 
Iran has also proceeded to infiltrate the Iraqi 
leadership system by providing the ruling junta of 
Iraq with consultation services on some political and 
economic issues experienced by Iraq which was in 
addition to intensifying dialogues and 
communications with them. Moreover, Iran gave the 
green light to its intelligence services for secret and 
overt political work in Iraq via Iran's Revolutionary 
Guards and Iranian intelligence (Wahid, & Hossam 
2013: 4). Similarly, the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs in Britain in a study in August, 
2006, reached the following conclusion “the Iranian 
influence in Iraq is stronger than that of the U.S.” 
(Ahmed 2008:82). 
 
Based on the foregoing, it can be concluded that Iran 
has taken advantage of the political vacuum resulting 
from the fall of Saddam regime as a result of the U.S. 
occupation of Iraq. Therefore, Iran has been able to 
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achieve its interests in Iraq and the Gulf region. Iran’s 
top priority was that Iraq must become a part of Iran's 
sphere of influence in competition with the U.S. and 
the GCC. Furthermore, Iran had a significant role in 
creating a weak and puppet political system in Iraq 
and was determined to intervene in Iraq's affairs to 
shape and direct the political process in its favor.  
 
3.2 Economic Influence of Iran in Iraq 
Iraq does not only represent political importance for 
Iran but it is also an economic one. According to 
Iran's decision makers, the importance of Iraq lies in 
its location which is situated in the northern part of 
the Arabian Peninsula and it is at the midpoint of 
three continents namely Europe, Asia and Africa 
(Barzegar 2008:53). Moreover, the area enjoys 
maritime significance that enables it to play a key 
role in determining the economic and political 
interests of certain states. Due to its overlooking site 
on the Arab Gulf, Iraq has strategic importance as it 
enjoys geo-strategic advantages with the existence of 
the largest oil reserves in particular. According to 
some estimates, Iraq's reserves of crude oil reaches up 
to 124 billion barrels which is equivalent to 11% of 
the world’s total reserves, in addition to other huge 
natural resources e.g., gas (Kumins 2004:2). It also 
ranks as the second richest country in the Arab World 
as its water resources amounts to 44.1 billion cubic 
meters per year, thus providing it with a huge 
agricultural potential. Moreover, Iran has considered 
Iraq to be a golden opportunity for Iran to rebuild its 
economy because it has repeatedly experienced 
fluctuations due to the economic sanctions that the 
U.S. imposed on Iran over its nuclear program (Al- 
Ghalib 2014:4-5). 
 
There have been many common interests between 
Iraq and Iran throughout history, particularly the 
economic ones. Due to the demise of Saddam regime, 
the relations between the two countries improved 
significantly. Iran contributed positively by providing 
Iraq with goods and energizing religious tourism and 
it also helped with the reconstruction process 
(Kawak, interview, 2015). 
 
However, Iran has no real interests in the 
reconstruction or encouragement of investments in 
Iraq, but its major interest was to make Iraq into a 
bigger market for Iranian products which can help to 
alleviate the effects of the economic sanctions 
imposed by the U.S. and the Western countries upon 
Iran because of its nuclear ambitions. Iran’s attempts 
to develop its economic relations with Iraq was to 
achieve its main objectives by using Iraq’s position 
OPEC with regards to oil quotas and the control of its 
prices in order to weaken the Saudi ’s position  in 
OPEC (Imran, interview, 2015). 
Iran takes advantage of its relations with the Iraqi 
government formed after 2003 to achieve its 
economic goals as Iraq has become the most 
important market for Iran's non- oil products. The two 
countries signed 110 economic memoranda of 
understanding and they also agreed to increase the 
electrical power exported to Iraq from 400 megawatts 
to 1000 megawatts (Azbawi 2004:85). Moreover, 
there has also been a boom in religious tourism with 
one million Iraqis visiting the Shiite shrines in the 
Iranian cities of “Qum” and “Mashhad” and a similar 
number of Iranians visiting the Shiite shrines in the 
Iraqi cities of “Najaf”, “Kazimiyah” and “Karbala” 
(Ahmed & Massad 2009:64-65). Other economic 
links include contracts concluded between some Iraqi 
mayors and Iranian companies and businessmen 
using some Iranian ports and shipping facilities for 
goods coming into Iraq. Iran also established 
economic relations in the fields of construction and 
communication with Iraqi Kurdistan (Al-Swedi 
1983:10). 
 
The Iranian’s economic interests in Iraq was also 
increased due to Iraq's dire need for both Iranian 
products to meet Iraq's basic needs and experience to 
help in the reconstruction of Iraq. Many Iranian 
companies have effectively contributed to investment 
in the construction, power and communication sectors 
in Iraq. In addition, the religious tourism also 
increased between two countries. More than two 
million Iranians visit the Shiite shrines in Iraq every 
year because of the close relationship in terms of faith 
and sect (Hassan, interview, 2015). Iran followed 
different procedures and exercised certain polices to 
sustain its economic interests in Iraq including 
(Wahid & Hossam 2013:4): 
1. Iran took advantage of the Iraqi markets and 
opened them for all kinds of products and making 
Iraq economically dependent on Iran in almost 
everything as demonstrated in Figure 5.2 below: 
2. Iran purchased some Iraqi assets (industrial, 
agricultural and real estate) and turned them into safe 
havens for its supporters to live in and to seek work, 
thus widening Iran's sphere of influence; 
3. It encouraged Iranian merchants to travel to Iraq 
and invest there, especially in the Shiite cities; 
4. Iran has plans to promote its Port “Al-Khumaini” 
as a substitute for Jordan's Port “Aqaba” and to link 
Iran and Iraq with a railway that extends to Syria and 
up to Turkey; and 
5. Iran has pursued strong ties with the wealthy 
people of Iraq both in the private and public sectors 
through the high class businessmen and high ranking 
officers in Iraq’s administrative body. 
 
Moreover, another economic infiltration that was 
exercised by Iran was its aim to reinforce its interests 
in the stealing of oil from the oil fields in Basra 
which is next to its border.  Iran has resorted to slant 
drilling to extract oil from Iraqi oil wells under the 
pretext of "shared wells" between the two countries. 
The total volume of stolen oil was estimated at 500 
thousand barrels per day (Wahid & Hossam 2013:4). 
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Iran considered the security of the Gulf region as an 
integral part of its security and thus it followed some 
strategies and procedures to achieve this security such 
as: 
1. It has sought to expand its nuclear program and 
develop its military capabilities in order to impose a 
balance of power situation in the Gulf region in 
particular and in the Middle East in general, 
especially with the intensified presence of the U.S. 
military in the region. 
2. It adopted a political and economic openness with 
the Gulf States in order to support the political and 
regional balance of power by means of building 
extended regional relations that can provide it with 
flexibility in political maneuvering and detach it from 
the international and regional isolation exercised by 
the U.S. in different ways.  
Based on the foregoing, Iraq has become an essential 
part in the strategies of Iranian decision-makers that 
has to be maintained. By virtue of its geographical 
location, its great amount of wealth and its religious 
ties with Iran, Iraq would always be of strategic 
importance to Iran. Hence, the Iranian decision 
makers would never cease regarding Iraq as one of 
the top priorities in their regional strategic planning 
that aims to achieve their supreme nationalist 
interests. Iran's pursuit of cooperation with Iraq in all 
fields via the various policies and tools would enable 
it to achieve political and economic gains at the 
expense of all other regional players in the region and 
would alleviate the effects of the economic siege 
imposed by the Western countries and the U.S. due to 
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